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Further Beyond the Republican Revival:
Toward Radical Republicanism
Paul Brest t
The contemporary revival of civic republicanism,1 with its focus on citi-
zenship, political equality, and deliberative decisionmaking, is surely a
good thing. Intellectually, it promises escape from the dead end in which
pluralist constitutional theory finds itself.' Politically, it moves toward ful-
filling the deepest human impulses that underlie liberalism.'
Nonetheless, I want to suggest that we must go far beyond the current
revival if we are serious about achieving republican aims. Most funda-
mentally, we must design and carry out programs of genuine participatory
democracy in the multifold spheres of human activity. Toward this end,
we must dispute the autonomy of conventionally "private" spheres, and
confront the connection between economic and political equality-lest our
theorizing be wholly arid and fantastical. Most radically-at least for le-
gal scholars-we must abandon our obsession with courts and work to-
ward the decentralization and democratization, not only of "ordinary"
politics, but of constitutional discourse and decisionmaking itself. I will
discuss the first points only briefly: though essential parts of the civic re-
publican agenda, they also are more familiar than the last.
Let me begin by reviewing why citizen participation in a "deliberative
democracy"4 is desirable and-to anticipate my main point-why judicial
exclusivity in constitutional matters is not.5 One reason, and a central
theme in the tradition of civic republicanism since the Athenian polis, is
that participation in the public sphere realizes an important aspect of
human nature and creates the foundation for a genuine community.' Al-
t Dean and Richard E. Lang Professor, Stanford Law School.
1. Although the term "civic republicanism" is redundant, conversations with colleagues and stu-
dents suggest the need to distinguish republican thought from the ideology of the party of Ronald
Reagan. I borrow the adjective from the Renaissance strain of republicanism known as "civic human-
ism." See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT
AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 58-60 (1975).
2. See Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative
Constitutional Law Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981); Parker, The Past of Constitutional The-
ory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (1981).
3. See, e.g., J.S. MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 43-66 (1873).
4. "Deliberative democracy" is Cass Sunstein's evocative term. See Sunstein, Beyond the Republi-
can Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
5. The following argument is made at greater length in Brest, Constitutional Citizenship, 34
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 75 (1986).
6. See Walker, A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy, 60 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 285, 288
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though I agree that participatory citizenship is a good in itself, I shall
focus on the instrumental argument-"hypothesis" or "hope" may be the
more accurate term-that participation tends to produce just laws or,
more broadly, a just society. As Hannah Pitkin writes:
[A]ctual participation in political action, deliberation, and conflict
must make us aware of our more remote and indirect connections
with others, the long-range and large-scale significance of what we
want and are doing. Drawn into public life by personal need, fear,
ambition or interest, we are there forced to acknowledge the power
of others and appeal to their standards, even as we try to get them to
acknowledge our power and standards. We are forced to find or cre-
ate a common language of purposes and aspirations, not merely to
clothe our private outlook in public disguise, but to become aware
ourselves of its public meaning. We are forced, as Joseph Tussman
has put it, to transform 'I want' into 'I am entitled to,' a claim that
becomes negotiable by public standards. In the process, we learn to
think about the standards themselves, about our stake in the exis-
tence of standards, of justice, of our community, even of our oppo-
nents and enemies in the community; so that afterwards we are
changed. Economic man becomes a citizen.'7
William Nelson has similarly argued that democracy "moralizes" the
process of government by requiring citizens and representatives to formu-
late conceptions of the common good in the course of justifying their
claims. 8
Elsewhere, I have called the process by which this moralizing or exter-
nalizing occurs "discursive participation"-participation that induces us
to listen to other people's positions and justify our own.9 Discursive par-
ticipation induces us to assume the "moral point of view" that lies at the
heart of most ethical-political systems.10
Political discourse-including legal and constitutional discourse-takes
place in a wide variety of institutions, including conventionally "private"
organizations like the family, corporation, union, and civic association as
well as in referenda, elections, conventions, school boards, city councils,
(1966); see also H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (1963); J.S. MILL, supra note 3, at 46; Keim, Partic-
ipation in Contemporary Democratic Theories, in NoMos XVI: PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS 1 (J.
Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1975).
7. Pitkin, Justice: On Relating Private and Public, 9 PoL. THEORY 327, 347 (1981) (footnote
omitted) (quoting J. TUSSMAN, OBLIGATION AND THE BODY POLITIC 78-81 (1960)).
8. See W. NELSON, ON JUSTIFYING DEMOCRACY 117-19 (1980).
9. See Brest, supra note 5, at 194.
10. The moral point of view is central to consequentialist and deontological theories. Discursive
participation is no less essential to a feminist ethics of caring and responsibility. "Justifications" here
may consist of thick descriptions of our perceptions and feelings, which may then be revised based on
others' expressions of their perceptions and feelings. Without discourse, we are in danger of partial or
myopic vision and in danger of reaching conclusions premised on incomplete understanding of their
consequences for others. Republicanism is open to diverse modes of discursive participation. See infra
note 40 and accompanying text.
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legislatures, and courts. It may take place in connection with paradigmatic
political activities such as lobbying or voting; or as part of "direct action"
such as a labor strike or a civil rights sit-in;"1 or it may consist simply of
talk among citizens.1 2 Modern history may not justify great optimism
about discursive participation in many of these institutions."' Nonetheless,
it is at least ironic that much of the legal scholarship of the republican
revival, rather than working to promote participation and discourse in
those forums, is as court-centered as the pluralist scholarship from which
it distinguishes itself.14 In striking parallel with the work of contemporary
(and essentially conservative) public choice theorists,' liberal republicans
treat the judiciary as the primary if not the only place where deliberative
democracy can take place. Sometimes with resignation, they treat the judi-
ciary as the "trace of the People's absent self-government."'"
To be sure, some republican programmatic proposals are aimed at im-
proving discursive participation in other institutions. For example, in Be-
yond the Republican Revival, Cass Sunstein argues for campaign finance
regulation and proportional representation as means of assuring that all
voices are heard in the political process.' 7 His arguments concerning ra-
tionality review and statutory construction are designed to encourage de-
liberation within legislatures. Sunstein also states that "the existence of
realms of private autonomy must be justified in public terms,"' and notes
"the close connection between republican systems and economic equal-
11. Civil rights activists in the 1960's engaged in endless deliberation about both the morality and
constitutionality of civil disobedience. In conversation, my colleague Bill Simon has observed that
Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967), which holds that a person may be convicted for
violating an unconstitutional injunction, devalues constitutional discourse and decisionmaking by citi-
zens. Cf R. DWORKIN, Civil Disobedience, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 206 (1977).
12. Citizens' discourse during the recent Iran-Contra and Bork nomination hearings are exam-
ples. One should not undervalue talk, even when it has no immediate political aim. Apart from its
intrinsic educational aspects, citizen talk may eventually influence political decisions. Indeed, it may
have contributed to Judge Bork's defeat.
13. See, e.g., Brest, Congress as a Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter Judi-
cial Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REv. 57 (1986). For some contemporary theoretical explanations of the
problem, see J. ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES 33-42 (1983); Riker & Weingast, Constitutional Regulation
of Legislative Choice: The Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L.
REV. 373 (1988).
14. Much of the republican scholarship also seems to assume a naive view of judicial delibera-
tions. For a more skeptical view, see B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE
THE SUPREME COURT (1979); Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1298 (1960);
Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765 (1982).
15. See, e.g., Riker & Weingast, supra note 13. Cf Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical
Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV.
199 (1988).
16. See, e.g., Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-
Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 65 (1986) (discussion of Bruce Ackerman); see also id. at 65-77;
Michelman, Democracy, Social Groups, and the Judiciary (unpublished paper 1987) (on file with
author). But see Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988) (building the foundations
for a "dialogic constitutionalism").
17. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1576-78, 1585-89.
18. Id. at 1551.
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ity."1 9 But he seems to shy away from the radical programmatic implica-
tions of these observations.
Civic republicans must broaden their focus beyond the judiciary, and
indeed, beyond government institutions. A civic republican conception of
citizenship supposes that people must be engaged in framing the rules and
administering the institutions that govern all aspects of their communal
lives. These institutions include the workplace as well as governments;20
the fact that workers have little power over many of the decisions that
immediately affect their lives is itself a serious participatory loss. Because
industrial democracy can provide the foundation for active citizenship in
conventionally "public" realms, its consequences reach beyond the work-
place. As T.B. Bottomore writes:
Can we accept that democratic government which requires of the
individual independent judgment and active participation in deciding
important social issues, will flourish when in one of the most impor-
tant spheres of life-that of work and economic production-the
great majority of individuals are denied the opportunity to take an
effective part in reaching the decisions which vitally affect their
lives? It does not seem to me that a man can live in a condition of
unalterable subordination during much of his life, and yet acquire
the habits of responsible choice and self-government which political
democracy calls for.21
John Stuart Mill spoke of the meaninglessness of a "political act to be
done only once in a few years, and for which nothing in the daily habits
of the citizen has prepared him."22 More recently, in a cross-cultural
study of political participation, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba noticed
that "political participation on the local level plays a major role in the
development of a competent citizenry. . . . [It] may act as a training
ground for political competence . . . [on] the national level." 2 What they
said about local government applies a fortiori to the workplace.
The civic republican aims of participatory democracy are also under-
mined by economic inequality. Economic need compromises the indepen-
dence that civic republican theorists deem a prerequisite to civic virtue"
19. Id. at 1552.
20. Republican citizenship may also affect the quintessentially private realm of the liberal family.
See C. Pateman, Women and Democratic Citizenship, Jefferson Memorial Lectures, U.C. Berkeley,
February, 1985; see also Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983) (critiquing public/private distinction). See generally Z. EISENSTEIN,
THE RADICAL FUTURE OF LIBERAL FEMINISM (1981) (republicanism linked to liberal feminism); N.
HARTSOCK, MONEY, SEX, AND POWER: TOWARDS A FEMINIST HISTORICAL MATERIALISM (1983).
21. Bottomore, The Insufficiency of Elite Competition, in FRONTIERS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY
127, 135 (H. Kariel ed. 1970). See generally, C. PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC
THEORY (1970); R. MASON, PARTICIPATION AND WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY (1982).
22. J.S. MILL, ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND CULTURE 229 (G. Himmelfarb ed. 1962).
23. G. ALMOND & S. VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE 188-89 (1963).
24. See J.G.A. POCOCK, supra note 1, at 381; Michelman, supra note 16.
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and produces political inequality. "[O]f all the factors that social scientists
have used to account for differences in political participation," Robert
Dahl has written, "differences in social and economic status are the most
important.125 "Those who are better off participate more, and by partici-
pating more they exercise more influence on government officials."26 Un-
equal resources produce unequal influence in determining which issues
get on the political agenda and, indeed, which even seem open to discus-
sion.2 7 Campaign finance regulations barely begin to remedy the system-
atic ways in which inequalities of wealth distort the political process.28
Of course, there is room for disagreement, even among civic republi-
cans, about the effects of, and remedies for, economic inequality and
privatization of important realms of communal activity. But it seems obvi-
ous that these must be central items on the civic republican agenda. Why
aren't they?29 One answer is: "We'll get there, but first we must lay the
theoretical foundations; legal scholars may properly begin to explore the
implications of republican theory in the areas most familiar to us." If so,
then surely it's about time to get on with our business. With due respect
to Cass Sunstein, one of the most brilliant contemporary republican legal
theorists, many of the proposals in Beyond the Republican Revival were
made some time ago by mainstream pluralist theorists like Gerald Gun-
ther and John Hart Ely.30
Another possible answer is that our expertise as legal scholars lies in
the realm of legal doctrine, especially judge-made doctrine, and that macro
issues of political and economic policy are best left to political scientists.
Even if our realm were thus limited, however, there would remain consid-
erable room for doctrinal work. Legal scholars have urged courts to re-
quire worker involvement in "management" decisions, 1 and in his justly
renowned article, On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment,32 Frank Michelman argued for an equal protection theory
25. R. DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 450 (3d ed. 1976); see also E.
SCHATTrSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE 31-32 (1960) (political system has upper-class
bias).
26. Id. at 449 (emphasis deleted).
27. See R. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY 47 (1982).
28. See, e.g., C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 203-14 (1977); S. LUKES, PowER (1974);
M TusHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 9,
280-92 (1988).
29. I will leave to a footnote the possible answer that the civic republican revival is just another
waystation in liberal constitutional law scholars' perennial quest for a defensible role for the judiciary.
30. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on A Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
31. See, e.g., Atelson, Management Prerogatives, Plant Closings, and the NLRA, 11 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 83 (1982-83); Klare, Labor Law and Workplace Democracy, CHIC. LAW.,
May 1987, at 24; Forum, 4 INDUS. REL L.J. 450 (1981); see also Lynd, Towards a Not-for-Profit
Economy: Public Development Authorities for Acquisition and Use of Industrial Property 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 13 (1987); Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 614
(1988).
32. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through
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that would provide "minimum protections" for the necessities of
life-protections that are preconditions for civic republican citizenship. 3
The courts' rejection of such arguments does not reduce their intellectual
power-though it may suggest, as a practical matter, that the case should
be made in other forums as well.
So we come to "other forums"-the focus of the remainder of this com-
ment. In particular, I shall argue against the court-centeredness of consti-
tutional scholarship-a myopia that, as I have said, pervades the work
even of civic republican scholars.3 4 Constitutional discourse and decision-
making are the most fundamental prerogatives and responsibilities of cit-
izens. Therefore, at the same time as civic republican scholars urge courts
to help democratize non-judicial institutions, we must counteract the ide-
ology and practices of judicial exclusivity. This may seem paradoxical. It
is at least complicated.
Even if constitutional decisionmaking took place only in conventions or
at other extraordinary historical moments,35 it would be important for cit-
izens to be involved in constitutional discourse at ordinary times-for the
methods or habits of "constitutional thinking" likely cannot be developed
on the spur of the moment. But constitutional decisionmaking does not
take place only at rare moments. If modern court-centered scholarship has
taught us anything, it is that the Constitution is constantly being made
and remade-through each act of interpretation.
The question, then, is whether only the courts may participate in this
ongoing process. The answer for civic republicans must be no-both be-
cause of the intrinsic importance of participation in such fundamental de-
cisions and for an instrumental reason: Even if courts remain the primary
agencies of constitutional change, judge-made doctrines are influenced by
publicly held values and conventional morality.3" To the extent that citi-
the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969).
33. Id.; see also Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q.
659.
Without basic education-without the literacy, fluency, and elementary understanding of polit-
ics and markets that are hard to obtain without it-what hope is there of effective participation
in the last-resort political system? On just this basis, it seems, the Supreme Court has itself
expressedly allowed that 'some identifiable quantum of education' may itself be a constitu-
tional right. But if so, then what about life itself, health and vigor, presentable attire, or shelter
not only from the elements but from the physical and psychological onslaught of social
debilitation? Are not these interests the universal, rock-bottom prerequisites of effective partici-
pation in democratic representation-even paramount in importance to education and, cer-
tainly, to the niceties of apportionment, districting, and ballot access on which so much judicial
and scholarly labor has been lavished? How can there be those sophisticated rights to a for-
mally unbiased majoritarian system, but no rights to the indispensible means of effective par-
ticipation in that system? How can the Supreme Court admit the possibility of a right to
minimum education, but go out of its way to deny flatly any right to subsistence, shelter, or
health care?
Id. at 677.
34. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
35. See Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984).
36. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) (relying partially on fact that major-
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zens' opinions are unreflective or misinformed, they will exercise a perni-
cious influence on constitutional decisions.
Civic republicans must therefore work to re-create 3 a space for citizens
and non-judicial institutions to participate in constitutional discourse and
decisionmaking. While courts can assist in the process, their role in the
political system must change in the very process. For James Bradley
Thayer was surely right that "[tihe tendency of a common and easy resort
to [judicial review] is to dwarf the political capacity of the people, and to
deaden its sense of moral responsibility.""8
The conflicted role of the judiciary is nicely illustrated by the situation
in Board of Education, Island Trees School District v. Pico. 9 There, the
Supreme Court, while saying that local school boards "must be permitted
to establish and apply their curriculum in such a way as to transmit com-
munity values,"'4 held that the appellant could not ban books from the
school library because of opposition to the ideas they expressed. From one
(civic republican) point of view, the Court correctly opted for freedom of
expression: preparation for self-government may require that citizens be
educated to engage in the critique of received values.41 But this ignores
another (civic republican) value, poignantly expressed in dissent by Chief
Justice Burger:
[L]ocal control of education involves democracy in a microcosm. In
most public schools in the United States the parents have a large
voice in running the school. Through participation in the election of
school board members, the parents influence, if not control, the di-
rection of their children's education. A school board is not a giant
bureaucracy far removed from accountability for its actions; it is
truly "of the people and by the people."4
On the one hand, judicial intervention may break up undemocratic pat-
ity of electorate thinks homosexual sodomy is "immoral and unacceptable" to find act not constitution-
ally protected); Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Functions of
Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689 (1976) (examining ethical function of courts); Wel-
lington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83
YALE L.J. 221, 243-54 (1973) (claiming judicial principles are derived from conventional morality).
Public opinion also affects the composition of appellate courts. President Reagan's unsuccessful
nomination of Judge Bork to the Supreme Court and the electoral defeat of Rose Bird as incumbent
Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court are two recent visible examples of this.
37. I say re-create because there have been times during our history when constitutional discourse
was not the near-exclusive domain of courts. Consider the debates over the constitutionality of slavery
before the Civil War. See W. WIEcEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA, 1760-1848 (1977); see also D. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY
OF RESPONSIBILITY (1966); cf. N. POLLACK, THE JUST POLITY: POPULISM, LAW, AND HUMAN
WELFARE (1987) (discussing populism and populist emphasis on Constitution).
38. J.B. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 45 (1901).
39. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
40. Id. at 864.
41. See, e.g., L. KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1981).
42. Pico, 457 U.S. at 891 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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terns of political power,4 and judge-made constitutional doctrine may en-
rich the vocabulary in which the local debate takes place. On the other
hand, aggressive judicial intervention may frustrate the outcome of citizen
participation in one of the few institutions where citizens can exercise
power. The bounds of the schools' socializing mission presents a funda-
mental constitutional issue-an issue too important to be left entirely to
the courts.
In fact, the library book issue engaged the populace of Island Trees in
public discourse to an extent that few political issues do. But who in fact
constituted the polity of Island Trees? Who controlled the agenda? Who
participated in public discourse, and who was heard? And what should a
civic republican make of the fact that the ultimate decision was one that
tended to close discourse? Thus, we encounter the perplexities of a pro-
grain for participatory consitutional decisionmaking. One way-perhaps
the only way-to encourage citizens to engage in constitutional discourse
is to uphold decisions like the one made by the Island Trees school board.
But to act as if its decision were the product of undominated discursive
participation is to pretend that the aims of democratic constitutional re-
form have already been achieved.
Extending the domain of constitutional decisionmaking beyond the judi-
ciary raises other questions as well. The traditions of adjudication virtu-
ally assure that constitutional discourse within the judicial system will dif-
fer noticeably from constitutional discourse in non-judicial institutions.
Citizens' and school board members' discussions about whether to ban li-
brary books will never look like the lawyers' or judges' elaboration of
doctrine in the Pico case. But this does not mean that adjudication ought
to set the standard by which other forms of constitutional discourse and
decisionmaking are measured. Different modes of discourse-even consti-
tutional discourse-may be appropriate to different institutions. One can-
not anticipate what these modes might be under different scenarios of par-
ticipatory constitutionalism," let alone how the various groups charged
with making and interpreting the Constitution should treat each others'
decisions.45 But constitutional discourse might sound quite different under
a civic republican practice of citizenship."
Consider an example that ties together the themes of this Comment.
The question of who should participate on what terms in local, state, and
43. See R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 52-56 (1983) (developing the
concept of destabilization rights).
44. This is especially true because of republicanism's relatively open epistemology. See, e.g.,
Michelman, supra note 16, at 23-31 (identifying practical reason as key to understanding civic dia-
logue); Sunstein, supra note 4 (same).
45. For a discussion of the latter issue in today's polity, see Brest, supra note 13.
46. Extending the responsibility for constitutional decisionmaking beyond the judiciary also blurs
the boundary between constitutional law and ordinary legislation. For much of the activity of constitu-
tional interpretation involves moral reasoning or, if you like, political decisionmaking from the moral
point of view, which bears a close resemblance to the civic republican legislative process.
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national governments has been the subject of important constitutional
decisionmaking during the past several decades.4 The condition of the
labor movement and the Court's rejection of the view that corporations are
quasi-public entities bound by the Constitution"' make the question of
participation in the workplace seem fanciful at this time. For republican
scholars and citizens, however, the question of participation in the work-
place is a potential constitutional issue of no lesser magnitude than partic-
ipation in government bodies. 9 Treating economic and industrial democ-
racy as central parts of our work may help eventually to put these issues
on the agenda-whether as "political" or "constitutional" questions
doesn't really matter.
There is, of course, reason for skepticism whether civic republican citi-
zenship, and especially participatory democracy in the conventionally pub-
lic spheres of politics, are at all possible in post-industrial society. Classi-
cal theorists thought that the republican virtues could flourish only in very
small communities. Participatory democracy has had few modern suc-
cesses and many failures. 5° But, if only because the alternative is so bleak,
there is every reason for republican legal theorists to join with other schol-
ars51 and practitioners52 to work to realize a genuinely participatory delib-
erative democracy.
47. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (examining election contribution and expendi-
ture restrictions); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down poll taxes);
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (striking down English literacy requirement).
48. See Berle, Constitutional Limits on Corporate Activity-Protection of Personal Rights from
Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1952) (discussing manners in which
courts do and do not police corporations).
49. Cf Sunstein, Rights, Minimal Terms, and Solidarity: A Comment, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1041
(1984) (discussing importance of labor laws that allow worker participation in workplace govern-
ment). For the history of relationship of workplace democracy and republicanism in the United States,
see D. MONTGOMERY, BEYOND EQUALITY: LABOR AND THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS (1967); S.
WILENTZ, CHANTS DEMOCRATIC (1984); Fink, Labor, Liberty, and the Law: Trade Unionism and
the Problem of the American Constitutional Order, 74 J. AM. Hisr. 904 (1987); Forbath, The Ambi-
guity of Free Labor: Labor and Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 767.
50. See, e.g., B. BARBER, THE DEATH OF COMMUNAL LIBErY (1974); J. MANSBRIDGE, BE-
YOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY (1980).
51. See, e.g., B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY (1984).
52. See, e.g., S. LYND, THE FIGHT AGAINST SHUTDOWNS: YOUNGSTOWN'S STEEL MILL CLOS-
INGS (1982).
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